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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DIXIE STATE BANK, Successor in
Interest to the Bank of Iron County,
a Utah Banking Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No. 870509-CA

vs.
LARRY E. KING, an Individual, KINGSCOTT HERITAGE FOUNDATION, INC.,
LARRY E. KING, P.C., a Utah Professional
Corporation and JOHN DOES I THROUGH V,
Defendants and Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, LARRY E. KING, an Individual
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Plaintiff brought its action below to recover from
Defendant, Larry E. King, an Individual, the deficiency arising
from a repossession and sale of a vehicle purchased by a
professional corporation, the stock of which corporation was
owned by the said Larry E. King.

Jurisdiction of this Court is

based on Section 78-2a-3 U.C.A. 1954.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether an individual shareholder may be held liable for

a corporation's debt on the theory that the corporation is the
"alter ego" of the individual in the absence of any evidence or

finding by the court that the corporation was used to perpetrate
a fraud, justify a wrong or defeat justice,
2.

Whether there was any evidence that, or finding by the

court that, the Larry E. King, P.C., a Utah Professional
Corporation, was used to perpetrate a fraud, justify a wrong or
defeat justice,
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is
determinative of this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case was tried before the Honorable Robert T.
Braithwaite, without a jury, on September 23, 1987.

There were

no legal memoranda submitted prior to nor after the trial and at
the conclusion of the evidence the Court issued its oral decision
denying Plaintiffs claims against Defendant, King-Scott Heritage
Foundation and against Defendant Larry E. King, an individual,
for fraud, for guaranty, for negligent representation and
omission.
The Court also granted Plaintiff's claims against the
professional corporation and against Defendant Larry E. King, an
individual, on the theory that Larry E. King, an individual, was
the "alter ego" of the professional corporation.
The Court entered judgment on October 20, 1987, against both
the professional corporation and against Larry E. King, an
individual, for $6,886.19, plus $1,700.00 in attorney's fees for
a total of $8,586.19 and interest at the rate of 16.25% per

annum.

The "Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law" and

"Judgment" are attached hereto as Appendix "A".
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Larry E. King Professional Corporation was incorporated
in Utah in the latter part of 1983 by Larry E. King M.D. (Tr.
26) .
The said professional corporation received initial capital
of some money (under $1,000.00) (R. 26-27), some medical supplies
and some used medical equipment (R. 37-38).

There was no

evidence as to the value of the medical supplies or the used
medical equipment nor the exact amount of the cash contributed.
Plaintiff made no request for information of any kind relating to
the creation, operation or dissolution of the corporation prior
to trial (R. 40) and merely called Dr. King as a witness without
any request that any facts be obtained from the corporate records
(R. 27, 32-33).
Dr. King had an attorney and an accountant prepare the
necessary legal documents to incorporate the professional
corporation and keep the corporate books (R. 31-32; 46-47; 6566).

The court found as a fact that the corporation never issued

stock to the owner of the stock (Para. 6(e) Findings of Fact).
However, the only evidence on that question was that Dr. King did
not remember whether or not the stock was actually issued (R.
27).

The professional corporation was dissolved in April 1986

(R. 27-28).
On April 22, 1985, the professional corporation made a
written request for a loan from the predecessor of plaintiff bank

in the amount of $19,000.00 and advised the bank that at that
time the corporation had assets of $1,800.00 and liabilities of
$1,200.00 with no other debt and no litigation pending against it
(Ex. P-l). Attached to the said request was a copy of the first
page of the corporate tax return for the period ended 6/30/84.
This return showed taxable income for that year in the amount of
$2,581.00 (Ex. P-l attachment).
The loan to the corporation was approved by the bank (R. 45, 14) and the bank prepared all the necessary documentation for
making the loan and the papers were executed on May 2, 1985, in
Plaintiff's office (R. 14). One of the documents prepared by the
bank was a document entitled "Loan Guaranty Agreement." (Ex. P3).

The trial court determined that there was conflicting

evidence as to said guaranty agreement and that plaintiff had not
sustained its burden of proof to impose personal liability on Dr.
King as a consequence of said guaranty agreement (Findings Of
Fact 5(b)).
The professional corporation failed to repay the loan made
to it, the bank repossessed the vehicle, sold it and brought suit
for the deficiency against Larry E. King individually and against
the professional corporation.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
"The immunity of limited stockholder liability is a
legislative grant and each instance of judicial disregard of this
is a direct assault against it.

Consequently courts have many

times reiterated the fact that the remedy is exceptional and will
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be resorted to only under the most imposing of circumstances."
(Kavich, Business Organizations S120.05[7]).
The ultimate issue of whether a corporation is the "alter
ego" of an individual is a question of law and the trial court 7 s
ruling on this question is entitled to no deference.
The Larry E. King, M.D. P.C. was a corporation, duly created
and existing pursuant to Utah law when it borrowed money from
plaintiff bank on May 2, 1985.
All pertinent facts pertaining to said corporation were made
known to plaintiff when the loan was applied for and when the
loan was granted.
the loan.

There was no fraud perpetrated in obtaining

There was nothing done or said to mislead plaintiff,

to justify any wrong or defeat justice.

There was, in fact, a

complete disclosure of the facts pertaining to the existence of
the corporation, its stockholder and its financial condition.
For a corporate entity to be the "alter ego" of its
stockholders two conditions must be met.

"First, 'there must be

such unity of interest and ownership that the separate
personalities

no longer exist.7

Second, 'the observance of

the corporate form [must] sanction a fraud, promote injustice,
or [cause] an inequitable result [to] follow7"

Municipal Bldg.

Authority v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1985).
The statutes governing creation of professional corporations
require that there be a "unity of interest and ownership" and
this condition must be satisfied in any validly created
professional corporation and was the situation in the Larry E.
King, M.D. P.C.

There was nothing in either the court's findings

nor in the evidence which would justify a conclusion that there
was any fraud, injustice or wrong committed by the professional
corporation nor by its stockholder, Larry E. King,

Because there

was no such evidence or finding, one of the necessary elements is
entirely lacking for this corporation to be the "Alter Ego" of
its stockholder and the judgment should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I
THIS APPEAL RAISES ONLY LEGAL ISSUES AND THE TRIAL COURT'S
RULING IS ENTITLED TO NO DEFERENCE AS TO THE QUESTION OF
WHETHER THE PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION SHOULD BE TREATED AS
THE "ALTER EGO" OF THE STOCKHOLDER SO AS TO IMPOSE PERSONAL
LIABILITY ON THE STOCKHOLDER FOR THE CORPORATION'S DEBTS.
The Utah Supreme Court has made it clear that where the
question before the trial court raises only legal issues, there
is no presumption of correctness which generally attaches to
judgments involving questions of fact.

In the recent case of

Taubert v. Roberts, et, al, 72 Ut. Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1987) the
Court said:
"Because this appeal raises only legal issues, we
give the trial court's ruling no deference.
See, e.g.,
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)
(citing Betenson v. Call Auto and Equipment Sales, Inc.,
645 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1982); Automotive Manufacturers
Warehouse, Inc. v. Service Auto Parts, Inc., 596 P.2d
1033, 1036 (Utah 1979))."
In Branscum v. Castleberry, 695 S.W.2d 643 (Texas 1985) the
Texas Court of Appeals reversed a jury verdict on the grounds
that the question of "Alter Ego" is a question of law and should
not be submitted to the jury.

The court said (p. 646):

"Furthermore, we hold that
whether a corporation is the alter

the ultimate issue of
ego of an individual

or individuals is a question of law and, therefore,
should not be submitted to the jury.
The jury is to
determine any disputed fact issues and then the court
should determine whether the facts, as found by the jury,
rise to the extraordinary level required to justify
disregarding the corporate
entity.
Because this
determination is a complex question of law, it must be
made by the trial court rather than by lawmen illequipped to resolve such questions."
II
FOR A CORPORATION TO BE DISREGARDED AND TO BE HELD TO BE
THE "ALTER EGO" OF ITS STOCKHOLDERS TWO REQUIREMENTS MUST
BE MET. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE AS TO ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL
REQUIREMENTS AND NO FINDING BY THE COURT THAT THERE WERE
ANY FACTS PERTAINING TO SUCH NECESSARY REQUIREMENT.
The Utah Supreme Court in Municipal Bldq. Authority v.
Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1985) stated:
"...For one corporate entity to be the alter ego of
another, two requirements must be met.
First, "there
must be such unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personalities of the corporation[s] ... no
longer exist."
Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan
Co.., Utah, 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (1979).
Second, "the
observance of the corporate form [must] sanction a fraud,
promote injustice, or [cause] an inequitable result [to]
follow."
Id.; accord Dockstaker v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d
370, 372-73, 510 P.2d 526, 528 (1973); Gude v. City of
Lakewood, Colo., 6.36 P.2d 691, 697-98 (1981).
Clearly the requirement that there be evidence that
observing the corporate entity would sanction a fraud, promote
injustice or cause an inequitable result is essential to a
determination that the corporation's existence should be
disregarded.

There was no evidence of any such facts and clearly

there was no finding by the court of such facts.
With regard to the necessity of the Trial Court's findings
on material issues the Utah Supreme Court in Gardner v. Gardner,
73 Ut. Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah 1988) stated:
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"Recently, in Acton v.
(Utah 1987), we noted:

Deliran, 737

P.2d 996, 999

'Failure of the trial court to make findings on all
material issues is reversible error unless the facts in
the record are 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment.7
Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah).
...The
finding of facts must show that the court's judgment or
decree 'follows logically from, and is supported by, the
evidence.7 Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah
1986).
The finding 'should be sufficiently detailed and
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached.7 Rucker, 598 P.2d 1338.
See also Mountain
States Legal Foundation v. Public Service Commission, 63 6
P.2d 1047, 1051 (Utah 1981).If
Because there was no evidence and no finding by the Trial
Court that one of the necessary requirements existed which would
justify disregarding the corporate entity the judgment should be
reversed.
This Court in Colman v. Colman, 67 Ut. Adv. Rep. 7 (Ut. Ct.
of App. 1987) considered a case involving the question of whether
a corporate entity should be disregarded and recognized the
necessity of the two requirements set forth by the Supreme Court
in the Municipal Bldg. case.

In the Colman case there were facts

which justified the conclusion that recognition of the corporate
entity would result in injustice.

Such facts do not exist in

this case.
Ill
THE LARRY E. KING M.D. P.C. WAS A VALIDLY CREATED, AND
VALIDLY EXISTING CORPORATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH UTAH LAW
AT THE TIME THE OBLIGATION TO PLAINTIFF WAS CREATED.
Plaintiff has not alleged in its complaint and has not
produced any evidence that the Larry E. King M.D. P.C. was not a
corporation validly created under Utah law.

The only allegation

regarding validity of the corporation is found in paragraph 40 of
the complaint in which it is alleged that the corporation is a
"sham and merely the 'alter ego 7 of Defendant King-11
It is not clear whether plaintiff contests the legal
existence of the Larry E. King M.D. P.C. or whether it accepts as
a fact the legal existence of the corporation and only contends
that the legal existence should be disregarded because of certain
alleged actions or failures to act of the corporation•
Two of the findings of fact, 6(b) and (c), relate to the
capitalization of the company.
Section 16-10-52 U.C.A 1954 provides in pertinent part that:
"A corporation shall not transact any business or
incur any indebtedness...until there has been paid in for
the issuance of shares consideration of the value of at
least one thousand dollars.11
The evidence, produced by plaintiff, was that the
corporation received money of under $1,000.00 (R. 27), medical
supplies (R.38) and some used medical equipment (R. 38). There
was no evidence produced nor asked for regarding the value of the
supplies or equipment and there was no evidence to support the
finding that "the corporation never received sufficient capital
in the first place to satisfy the requirement of Utah law that
$1,000.00 be placed in capital. ..."

(Findings of Fact 6(c)).

Even if it were true that there was a failure to pay in
$1,000.00 prior to beginning business the corporate existence
would not be destroyed.

The remedy for such a failure is found

in Section 16-10-44 U.C.A. 1954 which provides that in the event
of a failure to pay in one thousand dollars before commencing

business the directors who assent thereto shall be liable to the
corporation for such part of the $1,000.00 which was not received
prior to beginning business.

There is no claim by anyone of such

an obligation.
Section 16-10-51 U.C.A. provides that upon issuance of the
certificate of incorporation the corporate existence shall begin
and the said certificate "shall be conclusive evidence that all
conditions precedent required of the incorporators have been
complied with" except for actions by the state to revoke the
certificate.

No such action was ever undertaken by the state.

In finding of fact 6(e) it is stated that the corporate
stock of the corporation was not issued to the owners.

There is

no statutory nor other legal requirement that stock be actually
issued, unless demand is made for certificates by the
shareholders.

The Utah Supreme Court in National Bank of the

Republic v. Beckstead, 68 U. 421, 250 Pac.1033, 1041 (Utah 1926)
stated:
"It
is,
however,
also
contended
that
the
subscription agreement was breached
by the company
because no stock certificates were delivered to the
subscribers.
No demand
was made
for the stock
certificates, and it has frequently been held that it is
immaterial that stock certificates are not delivered or
tendered. ..."
While some of these questions are sometimes considered by
courts to determine whether there is "such unity of interest and
ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation[s]
...no longer exist" (Municipal Bldg. Auth., supra p278) they do
not justify disregarding the corporate entity absent the use of
the corporation to sanction fraud, promote injustice or cause an
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inequitable result.

Such questions are not probative of the

question of fraud, injustice or inequity and do not control the
determination of that question.
In the Municipal Bldq. case, supra the court found the
requirement of unity of interest clearly satisfied (p. 278):
"...The
first
of
these requirements obviously is
satisfied here:
the interest of the county and the
Authority are identical; under the Act, a buildinq
authority must work at the behest of the creating
governmental unit, U.C.A., 1953, 11-29-3(1) (Supp. 1985);
and the county commissioners qua commissioners are the
trustees of the Authority. Id."
However, the corporate entity was not disregarded because
there was no fraud, injustice or inequity which arose because of
the corporate activity.
IV
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION MUST, ACCORDING TO STATUTE BE
OWNED AND CONTROLLED BY THE PROFESSIONAL WHO RENDERS
SERVICE FOR THE CORPORATION BUT THERE IS NO LIABILITY FOR
NON-PROFESSIONAL
SERVICES
IMPOSED
ON
THE
SAID
STOCKHOLDERS.
The Legislature, iji enacting the professional corporate
statutes, could have imposed personal liability on stockholders
of a professional corporation for non-professional activities, as
three states have done.
S82.03[l]).

(See Kavich, Business Organizations,

However, Utah did not elect to impose such liability

on stockholders of professional corporations.

Section 16-11-5

U.C.A. 1953 provides as follows:
"Application Of Utah Business Corporation A c t —
Conflicts.—The Utah Business Corporation Act shall be
applicable to professional corporations, and they shall
enjoy the powers and privileges and be subject to the
duties,
restriction
and
liabilities
of
other
corporations, except where inconsistent with this act.
This act shall take precedence in the event of any

conflict with provisions of the Utah Business Corporation Act
or other laws,"
In the case of We7re Assoc. Co. v. Cohen, et al, 480 NE 2d
357 (N.Y. 1985) the Court of Appeals of New York held that
stockholders of a professional service corporation are not liable
for the ordinary business debts of the corporation.

The court

said (p. 1275):
"Our decision should work no injustice on those who
enter into
leases
or
any
other
contracts with
professional service corporations, who are free to seek
the personal assurances of the shareholders that the
commitments of the professional service corporation will
be honored. Nor do we intend to countenance any abuse of
the corporate form of doing business, which, if present
in a future case, could compel a different result (cf.
Walkovszky v. Carlton, supra). What we do hold is that,
absent any showing of such abuse, the shareholders of a
professional
service
corporation
cannot
be
held
personally liable for an ordinary business debt of the
corporation. ..."
The Utah Professional Corporation Act Sections 16-11-8
U.C.A. 1953 requires that no person, other than the professional
act as officer, director or shareholder of the corporation,
except a non-licensed person may serve as secretary or treasurer.
Section 16-11-4(3) U.C. A. 1953 provides that "if a
corporation has only one shareholder, the board may consist of
that shareholder."
It appears that the requirement of a unity of interest
between any professional corporation and its stockholders must
exist or the corporation would not satisfy the legal requirements
established by the legislature to create such professional
corporation.
Unless there is some fraud, injustice or inequity which
results from the corporate activity the corporate entity will not
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be disregarded because of the unity of interest between the
corporation and its stockholders.
The Larry E. King, P.C., a Utah professional corporation
made a complete disclosure of all pertinent information to
plaintiff prior to the preparation of the contract documents by
the plaintiff and execution thereof by the officers of the
professional corporation.

Exhibit P-l was presented to plaintiff

at the time the loan was applied for and it clearly states that
the corporate assets were $1,800.00, the liabilities were
$1,200.00 and the net taxable income for the prior year was
$2,581.00.

This is not a case where the plaintiff was misled by

false information.

All the facts, on which the trial court

relied in disregarding the corporate entity were fully disclosed
prior to the loan being approved.
In the case of Savage v. Royal Properties, Inc., 417 P.2d
925 (Ariz. 1966) the Court of Appeals of Arizona considered a
case where the plaintiff contended that a corporate entity should
be disregarded "where one corporation is so organized and
controlled, and its affairs are so conducted that it is, in fact,
a mere instrumentality or adjunct of another corporation11 (p.
927).

The Arizona court refused to disregard the corporate

entity where the plaintiff was aware of the facts pertaining to
the relationship between the parties.

The court quoted the

following from a Michigan case (p. 927):
11

'A claimant of the subsidiary corporation cannot be
said to have been affected by the parent's use of the
subsidiary as a mere instrumentality, if with knowledge
of all the facts at the time he entered into the
transaction with the subsidiary, he accepted or approved
the relationship between the two corporations.'"

V
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE PARTY MAKING THE CLAIM. IN
THIS CASE THERE WAS NO CLAIM, NO EVIDENCE AND NO FINDING
WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY A CONCLUSION THAT THE CORPORATION WAS
UTILIZED TO SANCTION FRAUD, PROMOTE INJUSTICE OR CAUSE AN
INEQUITABLE RESULT
AND THAT THE CORPORATION SHOULD
THEREFORE BE DISREGARDED AS AN ENTITY.
The Utah Jury Instruction Forms clearly state the basic law
regarding burden of proof as follows (1.10).
"...the burden of proving any disputed fact rests upon
the party claiming that fact to be true..."
Kavich, Business Operations S120.05[7] states:
"The person who asserts the applicability
theory has the burden of proving that the
not have a separate and distinct identity."

of the alter-ego
corporation does

Plaintiff alleged in its complaint that the professional
corporation was a closely held one-man corporation (parag. 3 6),
that defendant King is an officer and stockholder thereof (parag.
37), that defendant King controls the activities of the
corporation for his own benefit and therefore the corporation's
acts are the personal acts of defendant King (parag. 38).
Plaintiff also alleged that King had defrauded Plaintiff by
altering loan documents (parag. 39) but the Trial Court held the
evidence insufficient to justify this claim and the question of
altering loan documents is not an issue on this appeal.
Based on the above allegations of fact, Plaintiff alleged
the legal conclusion that the professional corporation was the
"alter ego" of defendant King.
None of these allegations, assuming them all to be true,
would justify a conclusion that the corporation was used to
sanction fraud, promote injustice or cause an inequitable result.

Also, the Trial Court's finding of fact do not even purport
to establish fraud, injustice or inequity.

The Trial Court found

certain facts, some of which have no support in the evidence, but
none of which, even if true, would justify a conclusion that
fraud, injustice or inequity was involved in the corporation's
activities.

A summary of the Trial Court's findings and

Defendant's comments thereon follow:
a.
Dr. King had difficulty identifying contracts which
generated corporate income.
The evidence on this point was that Dr. King was
attempting
to
obtain
written
contracts, was not
successful in large part because the other party to the
agreement ran out of funds and could not continue (Record
52-55) .
b.

The corporation was undercapitalized.
There is no evidence as to what capital was
There is no legal requirement regarding the
capital, except as to initial capital. In any
actual capital of the corporation was fully
before the loan was approved (Exhibit P-l).

required.
amount of
event the
disclosed

c.

The $1,000.00 required by Utah law was not paid in.
The evidence was that cash, supplies and equipment
were paid in to the corporation (Record 26-27, 37-38).
The plaintiff, which had the burden of proof, produced no
evidence whatever as to the actual amount of money, the
value of the supplies or of the equipment.
Certainly
there was no evidence to show that less than $1,000.00
was paid in. Even if less than $1,000.00 had been paid
in, such fact does not disenfranchise the corporation.
The remedy for such a situation is covered by Section 1610-44 U.C.A. 1954 which provides for payment of any
deficiency in the initial capital by the directors.
d. That some corporation property—the vehicle owned by
the corporation, was used by the corporate officer for
personal purposes.
Many
corporations
make
vehicles
available to
corporate employees for business and personal use. No
case and no statute has been found which makes such use
either illegal or a fraud on corporate creditors.
e.

Corporate stock was not issued.
The law does not require that corporate stock be
issued, unless it is requested.
There was no evidence

that the stock was not issued, only that Dr. King did not
remember whether or not it was issued (Record 27) . The
burden of proving this fact was Plaintiff's and the
evidence produced proved nothing.
In any event, it is
immaterial whether or not the stock was actually issued.
f.
Larry King controlled the corporation and he took
money out and put it in at his will.
Clearly Larry King controlled the corporation.
The
law
requires
that
the professional and only the
professional own the stock and act as officer and
director.
The only evidence regarding taking money out or
putting it in the corporation was plaintiff's counsel's
statement that "So you basically took money whenever you
wanted it, essentially, right?"
(Record p. 42). Dr.
King's reply to this statement was that he could only
take money when there was some available. This is a fact
of life applicable to everyone and only shows that there
was insufficient income to pay Dr. King his compensation
on a regular basis.
g. The corporation was voluntarily dissolved at the time
when the last payments were made on the corporation's
note to plaintiff.
The evidence was that the corporation was dissolved
because the corporation had obligations to the Internal
Revenue Service which it could not pay and if the Revenue
Service required payment there would be nothing left to
pay Dr.
King to live on (Record pp. 49-50).
A
substantial amount of money would be required to do the
legal work to update the corporation's pension profit
sharing plan, which money the corporation did not have
(Record p. 51).
Also, the corporation was dissolved
because its sources of income had terminated. (Record pp.
52-55).
There was no evidence that the corporation was
terminated in order to avoid the obligation to plaintiff.
None of these findings, no evidence in the case and no
allegation in the complaint purport to establish that the
professional corporation in this case was ever used to perpetrate
a fraud, justify a wrong or defeat justice.

In the absence of

such facts the corporate existence may not be disregarded on the
theory of "alter ego" and by so doing impose personal liability
on the corporation's stockholder.
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
Spencer & Anderson

By:
fele E.Anderson
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Mailed four copies of the foregoing "Brief Of Appellant,
Larry E. King, an Individual" this tf~K_. day of
/^g^O/
,
1988, by depositing the same in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, addressed as follows:
Russell J. Gallian, Esq,
1 South Main Street
P.O. Box 367
St. George, Utah 8477 0

Dale E. Arfderson
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GALLIAN & WESTFALL
RUSSELL J. GALLIAN
Attorney for Plaintiff
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING
P. 0. Box 367
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770
(801) 628-1682
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
IRON COUNTY, CEDAR CITY DEPARTMENT

DIXIE STATE BANK, Successor in
Interest to BANK OF IRON COUNTY,
a Utah Banking Corporation,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff
vs.
LARRY E. KING an Individual,
KING-SCOTT HERITAGE FOUNDATION,
INC., LARRY E. KING, P.C., a
Utah Professional Corporation and
JOHN DOES I through V,

Civil No. 87-CV-029

Defendants

The matter having come before the above entitled Court for
trial, and the Court having considered the evidence by both the
Plaintiff and Defendant and the argument of counsel and good cause
appearing therefore, and the Court having entered its Findings of
Fact

and

Conclusions

of Law, the Court

therefore

renders the

following Judgment:
1.

Plaintiff shall have iudqment aaainst the Defendant Larry

E. King on the Third Cause of Action of the Complaint in the amount
of $6,886.19, together with attorney's fees of $1,700.00 for a total
R12/19

judgment of $8,586.19, which judgment shall hereafter bear interest
at the rate of 16.25% per annum until paid.
2.

That

the

Plaintiff

is

awarded

judgment

aqainst

the

Defendant Larry E. King, M.D.,P.C. in the amount of $6,886.19,
together with atorney's fees in the amount of $1,700.00 in a total
judgment of $8,586.19 to hereinafter bear interest at the rate of
16.25% per annum until paid.
3.

That the First and Second Causes of Action against the

Defendant Larry E. King are hereby dismissed with prejudice and on
the merits.
4.

That

the

Complaint

against

the

King

Scott-Heritage

Foundation is hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.
5.

No court costs are awarded except as already included in

the Judgment above.
ENTERED this

day of

, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

Circuit Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Findings <&f Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage prepaid,
this '. -ft*, day of Jv^f*
, 1987, to the following:
Dale E. Anderson, Esq.
Attorney for Defendants
Spencer & Anderson
P.O. Box 22103 AMF
1973 West North Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84122
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GALLIAN & WESTFALL
RUSSELL J. GALLIAN
Attorney for Plaintiff
ONE SOUTH MAIN STREET
DIXIE STATE BANK BUILDING
P. 0. Box 3^7
ST. - GEORGE", UTAH 84770
(801) 628-1682
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
IRON COUNTY, CEDAR CITY DEPARTMENT

DIXIE STATE BANK, Successor in
Interest to the BANK OF IRON
COUNTY, a Utah Banking
Corporation,

)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff
vs.

)

LARRY E. KING an Individual,
KING-SCOTT HERITAGE FOUNDATION,
INC., LARRY E. KING, P.C., a
Utah Professional Corporation and
JOHN DOES I through V,

)

Defendants

)
Civil No. 87-CV-029
)
)

The matter having come before the above entitled Court for
trial, and the Court having considered the evidence by both the
Plaintiff and Defendant and the argument of counsel and good cause
appearing therefore, the Court enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

As to the First Cause of Action the Court finds that the

Note and related documents were signed by Larry E. King, M.D.,P.C,

R12/18

and that said corporation, which has been voluntarily dissolved

is

liable for the amount due and owing to the Bank of IiQn County*
2*

The parties have stipulated that the real pqrty in interest

in the case is Dixie State Bank who has assumed tho assets of the
Bank of Iron Co.unty.
3.

The proper amount due and owing under the complaint as of

the date of trial is $6,886.19, and said note bore interest at the
rate of 16.25% per annum until paid.
4.

That the Plaintiff's attorney, Russell J. Gallian of the

firm of Gallian & Westfall, incurred additional att orne y» s fees of
$1,700.00 which are properly assessable to the case, no court costs
were requested other than those included in the computation of the
amount due under the note for monies advanced to pri*>r counsel.
5.

With respect to the personal guaranty that

on

its face was

signed by Larry E. King, M.D.,P.C. by Larry E. King^ President, the
Court finds the following:
a.

That the document was presented to Lq rr y E . King for

his personal guarantee.
b.

The Court finds that there is a dii nC t conflict of

testimony as to whether or not the Bank of Iron ( ()unty was aware
that Larry E. King did not intend to sign personal iy#

Under these

circumstances the Court finds that the Plaintiff hab

carried its

not

burden as to Dr. King's liability under the personal guaranty, which
had been altered by Dr. King.

Accordingly, the c f)Urt also finds

that the Plaintiff has also not met its burden of ptf)0f on its claim
for negligent misrepresentation.
6.

With respect to the alter ego theory presented by the
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Plaintiff, the Court finds the following:

speaking

a.

That

the

was

unable

to

Defendant

Dr.

Larry

distinguish

E. King

between

himself

generally
and

his

corporation with respect to contracts which generated income for the
corporation.
b.
c.

That the corporation was undercapitalized.
That

the

corporation

never

received

sufficient

capital in the first place to satisfy the requirement of Utah law
that $1,000.00 be placed in capital in the corporation prior to
commencing business.
d.

That there was some of the corporate property used for

personal purposes, including specifically the, ««tomobile which was
pledged as to security for the loans which are the subject matter of
this lawsuit.
e.

That the corporate stock of the corporation was never

issued to the owners thereof (Larry King).
f.

That the corporation was

fully controlled by the

Defendant Larry E. King, and that said Defendant took money out and
put income in at his will.
g.

That the corporation was voluntarily dissolved by the

Defendant close in time to the last timely payments being made under
the note which is the subject matter of this lawsuit, and that at
that time the Defendant Larry E. King withdrew his income earninc
ability as a physician from his professional corporation.
h.

That Larry E. King M.D.,P.C. was the alter ego of

Defendant Larry E. King.
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7.

The Court finds that the King-Scott Heritage Foundation, a

named Defendant herein, had executed the chattel mortgage for the
vehicle which was the security for the loans provided for, but that
said Defendant did not execute any of the documents and is therefore
not

liable.

Based

upon

a

Stipulation

by

the

Plaintiff, the

Complaint against said defendant should be dismissed.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court enters the
following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the Plaintiff has not met his burden as to the First

and Second Cause of the action and with respect to the same the
Court finds no cause of action against the individual Defendant
Larry E. King, either on the theory of liability under the guaranty
or by virtue of negligent misrepresentation.
2.

That the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Larry E.

King, M.D. ,P.C. in the amount of
attorney's

fees

for a total

$6,886.19, plus

judgment of $8,586.19.

$1,700.00 in
That said

judgment shall hereafter bear interest at the rate of 16.25% per
annum.
3.

The Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the Defendant

Larry E. King by virtue of the fact that it is established that the
Larry E. King, M.D.P.C. was the alter ego of the individual defendant
Larry E. King, and that the Plaintiff is therefore entitled to
judgment against the Defendant in the amount of $6,886.19, together
with attorney's fees in the amount of $1,700.00 for a total of
$8,586.19, together with interest from the date of judgment in the

amount of 16.25% per annum.
4.

The Court having found no basis tor" further claim against

King-Scott Heritage Foundation, and based upon the Stipulation of
the

Plaintiff,

the

Complaint

against

the

King-Scott

Heritage

Foundation should be dismissed.
DATED this j/Pj^

da

Y

of

^MLIDJ^JC.

_ * 1987.

BY THE COURT:

Circuit Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true arid correct copy of the
foregoing Findings 6f Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage prepaid,
this 3$^
day of JUki/# 1987, to the following:
Dale E. Anderson, Esq.
Attorney for Defendants
Spencer & Anderson
P.O. Box 22103 AMF
1973 West North Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84122

